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1. Philosophically, twentieth century was in many ways the century of “scientific 
philosophy”. At any rate we can say, following Georg Henrik von Wright, that among all the 
philosophical trends of the past century, the so-called “analytic philosophy” was “the most 
typical of the spiritual climate of the time” (von Wright 1993: 25), a status which was due to 
“its alliance with the two forces which more than any other have stamped contemporary 
civilization: science and technology” (ibid.) As von Wright points out, however, the alliance 
is not characteristic of all of analytic philosophy. He quotes from a paper by Friedrich 
Waismann, where the author draws a sharp distinction between philosophy and science as 
two “fundamentally different types of attitudes of the human mind” (Waismann 1939: 265). 
The scientific spirit seeks knowledge or propositions which are true, an attitude which, when 
cultivated on a higher level, manifests itself as the formation of scientific theories. The 
philosophical spirit, on the other hand, does not seek true propositions but an increase in 
inner clarity; insofar as there has been progress in the history of philosophy, this lies not so 
much in results as in the formulation of questions (ibid.)  
The view expressed here by Waismann was accepted by many philosophers who 
qualify as “analytic” by some suitable criterion. Indeed, if there is such a thing as the standard 
picture of analytic philosophy, it is probably not very far from what Waismann describes 
under the rubric of “philosophical spirit”. But then it is no longer clear what the connection is 
between science and analytic philosophy and what the alliance with science and technology is 
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supposed to consist in; at any rate, no such connection is included in the “definition” of 
philosophy, as Waismann would have it; the connection is, so to speak, external and not 
internal. 
On the other hand, many of those philosophers whom conventional wisdom classifies 
as “analytic” have represented the scientific, rather than the philosophical spirit; this applies 
even to some of the classics of analytic philosophy.1 Here the interpretative problem is a 
mirror-image of the above: what makes a scientific philosopher into a representative of the 
specifically analytical trend in philosophy? 
The case of Eino Kaila and his philosophical work provides a good illustration of this 
“tension” within analytic philosophy. From the early 1920s on, Kaila maintained contacts 
with many of those philosophers who would later organize themselves into the Vienna Circle; 
in the Circle’s Manifesto, Kaila is mentioned among the associates of the Circle; and what are 
probably his two most important philosophical works, Kaila (1936) and (1941), are subtitled 
“contributions to logical empiricism”. These contacts and connections with logical 
empiricism are the closest that Kaila came to being an analytic philosopher.  
Yet, on the other hand, the term “analytic” does not apply very well to Kaila’s work. 
His vision of philosophy was synthetic rather than (purely) analytic. For instance, one of his 
early monographs is entitled Beiträge zu einer synthetischen Philosophie, “Contributions to a 
synthetic philosophy”. In the Finnish version of his paper on Kaila’s monism, von Wright 
says of Beiträge that it is “one of the boldest and most original attempts ever in Finnish 
                                                 
1 Von Wright (1993: 28–9) mentions the Russell of the 1920s as an example of such a 
philosopher. 
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philosophy to develop a ‘complete’ philosophy”.2 This search for a complete philosophy is, 
indeed, characteristic of Kaila; as von Wright (1992b: 76) observes, Kaila aimed at synthesis, 
monism and unification. What Kaila had in mind was a monistic philosophy of nature in the 
sense of Naturphilosophie. Such an enterprise was quite a few steps away from logical 
empiricism, just as it is from anything that we are accustomed to acknowledge as analytic 
philosophy. 
In the present paper I will not investigate the development of Kaila’s monistic 
Naturphilosophie – von Wright (1992b) provides an overview of this.3 My aim is the much 
more modest one of finding a plausible answer to the question, “In what sense was Kaila a 
scientific philosopher?” There can be no doubt that Kaila’s philosophy was scientific in the 
most serious and non-superficial sense of that term; his involvement in Naturphilosophie in 
no way compromises this. On the other hand, the import that “scientific philosophy” had for 
him was not tied to the specifics of the monistic philosophy of nature. Thus, focusing what in 
Kaila’s view makes for a scientific philosophy may help us to locate his place in the 
twentieth-century philosophical landscape. 
I don’t know whether this kind of mapping by which one seeks to establish a 
philosopher’s relations to the more conspicuous of the intellectual trends of his or her time is 
a worthwhile pursuit. Certainly, not very much is brought to light in this way, as long as our 
observations remain on a relatively general level. Every serious attempt at identifying the real 
character of a philosopher’s work should do justice to particularities; and personally, I’m not 
convinced that the so-called meta-philosophy – or better, “philosophy of philosophy”, as in 
                                                 
2 Von Wright (1992a: 83); this sentence is not included in the English version of the 
essay (1992b). 
3 But I will mention it briefly in section 7. 
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Williamson (2007) – is the most fruitful of philosophers’ undertakings. Nevertheless, an 
occasional foray into this terrain may not be time misspent. 
 
2. What, then, are the features that make Kaila’s philosophy scientific and what relationship 
do they bear to other, similar-sounding ideas? Let me begin answering this question by 
considering one well-known call for scientific philosophy, issued by Bertrand Russell just 
before the outbreak of the First World War:  
 
By concentrating attention upon the investigation of logical forms, it becomes possible 
at last for philosophy to deal with its problems piecemeal, and to obtain, as the sciences 
do, such partial and probably not wholly correct results as subsequent investigation can 
utilise even while it supplements and improves them. Most philosophies hitherto have 
been constructed all in one block, in such a way that, if they were not wholly correct, 
they were wholly incorrect, and could not be used as a basis for further investigations. 
It is chiefly owing to this fact that philosophy, unlike science, has hitherto been 
unprogressive, because each original philosopher has had to begin the work again from 
the beginning, without being able to accept anything definite from the work of his 
predecessors. A scientific philosophy such as I wish to recommend will be piecemeal 
and tentative like other sciences; above all, it will be able to invent hypotheses which, 
even if they are not wholly true, will yet remain fruitful after the necessary corrections 
have been made. This possibility of successive approximations to the truth is, more than 
anything else, the source of the triumphs of science, and to transfer this possibility to 
philosophy to ensure a progress in method whose importance it would be impossible to 
exaggerate. (Russell 1914a: 110) 
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Like many other philosophical reformists, Russell was convinced that whether a philosophy 
is scientific or unscientific is determined by method. According to the Russell of 1914, the 
correct method was “logical constructions”, of which the paradigmatic example is the 
construction of numbers as equivalence classes of equinumerous classes and the point of 
which – at least as Russell saw it – was the avoidance of unnecessary metaphysical 
postulates. But its application was in no way limited to the philosophy of mathematics. This 
is readily seen by considering the projects in which he was engaged immediately after the 
completion of Principia. For example, in Our Knowledge of the External World the method is 
applied to the problem of the external world, with a view to showing how “the derivative 
parts of our common knowledge arise” (1914b: 54); that is, how that which tends to become 
more or less doubtful under the process of critical reflection (“soft data”) can be exhibited as 
a function of such data as resists this process; this “hard data” consists of the facts of sense 
together with some facts of memory and introspection plus the general logical truths (ibid. 
56–8). 
The inspiration behind genuinely scientific philosophy is purely factual. Such 
philosophy, Russell explains, is piecemeal and tentative; which means that even when they 
turn out not to be wholly true, the scientific philosopher’s hypotheses still remain capable of 
revision and can be used as a basis for future work. Evidently, then, Russell’s agenda for 
scientific philosophy is at least partly motivated by the idea, familiar from the history of 
philosophy, that in philosophy, too, correct method will ensure genuine progress: 
 
The problems and the method of philosophy have, I believe, been misconceived by all 
schools, many of its problems being insoluble with our means of knowledge, while 
other more neglected but not less important problems can, by a more patient and more 
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adequate method, be solved with all the precision and certainty to which the most 
advanced sciences have attained. (Russell 1914b: 1)  
 
But, Russell continues, method is not the only area where philosophers have sought 
inspiration from science. A different way of using science is in evidence in much of 
traditional philosophy. Here one draws on some actual results of current science, which are 
used as a basis for a characteristically philosophical unification and generalisation. For 
example, many past metaphysicians were guided by the essentially pre-Copernican idea of 
the universe as a single system concerning which they thought they could draw conclusions 
with strong ethical and religious overtones.  
The building of such thoroughly anthropocentric metaphysical systems, apparently 
warranted by the pre-Copernican geocentric astronomy and motivated by “the hope that the 
course of nature might be guided by some sympathy with our wishes” (Russell 1914a: 98), 
discards what is the most valuable feature of the scientific method. A metaphysical system is 
“constructed in one block”, with the consequence that if the underlying scientific 
generalisation, which the metaphysician has given an absolute and rigid form, turns out to be 
incorrect, the system must then be given up as wholly incorrect, as it retains none of the 
flexibility that is characteristic of a genuinely scientific use of hypotheses. 
Having thus discarded much of traditional metaphysics as a non-factual enterprise, 
Russell adds the familiar proviso that philosophy, when it is “inspired by ethical notions”, can 
be of the highest significance but that the value of such philosophising does not belong to the 
sphere of reason and argument: 
 
What is valuable is the indication of some new way of feeling towards life and the 
world, some way of feeling by which our own existence can acquire more of the 
[Type text] [Type text] 
7 
 
characteristics which we must deeply desire. The value of such work, however 
immeasurable it is, belongs with practice and not with theory. (ibid. 107) 
 
3. Let us now return to Eino Kaila. I have already described Kaila’s philosophy as “scientific 
in the most serious and non-superficial sense of that term”. Could a comparison to Russell’s 
scientific method help us put Kaila’s conception of philosophy in a larger context? 
It is clear enough that Kaila did not use scientific ideas in the speculative, metaphysical 
way criticized by Russell. Some of Kaila’s ideas in his Naturphilosophie may deserve to be 
called “speculative”, but he was too much concerned with reality, and with attaining real 
knowledge, that he could have given in to the sort of speculation that claims inspiration from 
science but in fact yields nothing but philosophy of the most vulgar kind; the young Kaila’s 
withering remarks on the philistine physiognomy underlying the then acute and popular 
monism of Wilhelm Ostwald and Ernst Haeckel come readily to mind here.4 What the 
philistine borrows from science are its “latest results”, arranged in an easily digestible form 
and put to use as the absolute building blocks for a “scientific world-view” – a description 
that comes quite close to what Russell would say about the misguided sort of scientific 
philosophy in “Scientific Method”. Kaila, himself an experimental psychologist as well as a 
philosopher, was too much involved in real science for there to be room in his physiognomy 
for the philistine attitude; and, of course, his philosophical temperament made such an 
attitude an impossibility for him.5 
                                                 
4 See Kaila (1911). 
5 Admittedly, Ostwald and Haeckel themselves were scientists – and Ostwald in 
particular of the highest order. Perhaps, then, the difference between the popular monists and 
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The other sense of scientific philosophy identified by Russell is more promising or our 
purposes; after all, there is a topical as well as historical connection between Russell’s 
method of logical constructions and Kaila’s concern with what may be called “The Problem 
of Constitution”.6 
In Russell’s case the motive behind his scientific method and its key maxim – 
“wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities” (1914c: 
149) – is easy to miss. This is mainly because his epistemology is commonly associated with 
Cartesian scepticism and is thus seen as an attempt to identify the absolutely unshakeable 
foundation for empirical knowledge. The fact is, however, that Russell saw little reason to be 
worried about scepticism in the traditional sense. His real problem is, indeed, one of 
constitution (or construction or reconstruction), to wit, the exhibition of our ordinary and 
scientific knowledge – in particular, our knowledge of the world of physics – in terms of 
what is given to us in immediate experience. And the recourse to immediate experience is 
there not because immediate experience provides a safeguard against doubt but because it is 
“undeniably involved” in our knowledge of physics, just as it is undeniably involved in our 
knowledge of almost anything else (cf. Russell 1914b: 84–6). 
Admittedly, Kaila’s earliest allusions to the general problem of constitution refer to 
Kant, rather than Russell. In the 1923 paper “Kantia lukiessa” (“Reading Kant”) Kaila argues 
that one of the ideas in Kant’s first Critique possessing permanent value is the idea of 
construction. ‘Objects’ and ‘natural events’, he explains, are never strictly speaking given to 
                                                 
Kaila was just one of philosophical temperament – one shallow, the other deep, one might 
want to say. 
6 I borrow this use of the term “Problem of Constitution” from von Wright (1979, p. 
xxx). It has, of course, application beyond Kaila (and Russell). 
[Type text] [Type text] 
9 
 
us, which is why we must construct them (1923, p. 398). The question arises: what are the 
principles underlying this construction, those “axioms of experience” on the basis of which 
“subjective states” are regarded as reflecting an “objective” natural order? This is the gist of 
Kant’s problem, and it is the question that creates epistemology in the modern sense of that 
term, according to Kaila.  
This mention of modern epistemology as well his subsequent discussion shows that 
Kaila’s real reference point is not so much Kant as the streamlined version of Kantianism 
according to which these axioms possess only relative, and not absolute, validity; Kaila 
mentions Reichenbach’s work on the theory of relativity as an example (ibid. 406–7).  
Kaila retains this view in Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik, where he argues that certain 
“transcendental hypotheses” – concerning the existence of an external world, of reliability of 
memory, of lawfulness, etc. – are contained in the concept of experience in the wider sense, 
namely in the sense that these hypotheses are genuine probability-statements possessing a 
factual ground and not just practical postulates, let alone Kantian “synthetic a priori 
judgments” (Kaila 1926a: III.1). 
The terminology of “transcendental hypotheses” disappears by the time Kaila comes to 
publish Beiträge zu einer synthetischen Philosophie in 1928, but the substance of the earlier 
view is still preserved: “The totality of our knowledge of the external world 
(Aussenwelterkenntnis) is a logical function of experiences” (1928: 49). This, Kaila holds, is 
an “exact expression of the logical fact that all grounds for regarding a given system of 
cognitions as true or probable are contained in actual experiences (in den tatsächlich 
gemachten Erfahrungen enthalten sind)” (ibid.)  
In spite of this formulation, Kaila retains a critical distance from Russell’s programme 
of logical constructions. The controversy is between realism (this being Kaila’s view) and 
phenomenalism (as in Russell’s programme). Kaila (1928: 48–53) argues that Russell 
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presents his phenomenalism as an inevitable consequence of two premises. The first is the 
“logical state of affairs” that all propositions about the external world are logical functions of 
(propositions about) perceptions; the second is Russell’s supreme maxim, which in Kaila’s 
formulation says that the introduction of new, non-given entities is always to be avoided, if 
these can be replaced by “logical constructions”, obtained through definitions from entities 
which are given (ibid. 50) 
Interpreting the second principle as a version of Occam’s razor (as does Russell 
himself), Kaila points out that Russell’s two premises are unassailable, but he then argues, 
pace Russell, that phenomenalism does not in fact follow from them.7 “Logical functions”, 
Kaila explains, fall into two distinct kinds: truth-functions and probability-functions, and 
“extra-phenomenal elements” cannot be truth-functions of perceptual propositions. They are 
not given and hence they are something new in relation to what is given; which is why they 
cannot be secured by deductive-logical means (cannot be defined on the basis of phenomenal 
elements). The extra-phenomenal can therefore only be a probability-function of the given 
(ibid. 51–2). 
Kaila’s argument hardly meets Russell on a neutral ground. Rather, it is one of those 
occasions where Kaila’s realism asserts itself. This realism is clearly in evidence, for 
example, in Kaila’s early formulations, in the mid-1920s, of the “Principle of Possible 
Experience” (Prinzip der Erfahrbarkeit); as Kaila understands it, the Principle states that 
every factual  proposition – every proposition which is about reality – must imply something 
that can be given in experience (Kaila 1926a: 152).8 For Kaila, at that time, this something is 
                                                 
7 For Russell’s own reasoning about this matter – which cannot be discussed here – see 
the beginning of Russell (1914c). 
8 Cf. Kaila (1926b: 52). 
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just the probability-ground of the statement whose factual content is in question. 
Accordingly, he criticizes “positivists” for overstating the Principle, as they see in it the 
maxim that every factual proposition must have as its object something that can in principle 
be given in experience (ibid. 159–60); that is, that every factual proposition is about 
something that can be so given. For Kaila, Russell’s phenomenalism is just a special case of 
“positivism” in this sense. 
Kaila met a more refined and less compromised version of Russell’s programme in 
Carnap’ Logische Aufbau der Welt. Russell had in fact made use of “inferred entities” in his 
logical constructions – sensibilia together with the sense-data of other people for which there 
is such evidence as is based, ultimately on the analogical argument in favour of other minds 
(cf. Russell 1914c: 151) – whereas Carnap’s actual starting-point in his constitution theory is 
strictly phenomenalist. Starting from what is “given”, Carnap seeks a rational reconstruction 
of empirical science, as regards its epistemic structure; this is Kaila’s formulation of the 
programme of Aufbau (Kaila 1930: 12). Here the given is understood solipsistically: it 
consists, in fact, in the past stream of the experience of an imaginary solitary thinker (ibid.) 
Carnap, Kaila observes, makes no explicit appeal to “Occam’s Razor” in the way 
Russell did. But the constitution theory assumes what Kaila calls the Principle of Analytic 
Equivalence. The proper form of definition is a sentence stating that two propositional 
functions are equivalent, and the Principle says that when the equivalence constitutes a 
definition, it implies identity of meaning (cf. Kaila 1930: §2 and p. 17).9 Now, every new 
                                                 
9 In his discussion-note on Kaila (1930), Carnap formulates the Principle explicitly in 
terms of analyticity, but this notion, too depends in the familiar manner upon that of 
definition. The Principle, he explains, “says that two concepts are identical in meaning 
(gleichbedeutend), if they are analytically equivalent, i.e., if there is an analytical sentence 
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concept must be defined, and the only thing that can ever be used in a defniniens is a concept 
that is given. It follows from the Principle, as Carnap himself puts it, that “nowhere in the 
constitution system can something fundamentally new be introduced” (Carnap 1932: 75–6). 
Or as Kaila observes, echoing his criticism of Russell’s phenomenalism: 
 
The domain of what is given, the ken of ‘my’ past experiences – i.e., the basic elements 
of the fictitious thinker A performing the construction – can never be left behind, can 
never be transcended. Indeed, ‘construction’ is nothing else but deduction. And no 
deduction in the world can bring to light anything other than what is already implicitly 
contained in what is given. Just as little as pure mathematics, if the natural numbers 
constitute its basis, can contain anything other than statements about classes, classes of 
classes, classes of relations … of natural numbers, just so little can empirical science 
contain anything other than statements about classes, classes of classes … of ‘my’ past 
elementary experiences. (1930: 15–6) 
 
Kaila continues to find this unacceptable. He observes, to begin with, that the results obtained 
by “logistic neopositivism” are downright catastrophic for classical philosophical problems, 
in particular for questions about reality (ibid. 15). From the point of view of Aufbau, there 
simply is no way of stating the content of the metaphysical controversy concerning the 
existence or non-existence of a reality transcending consciousness. As Kaila puts it, 
                                                 
expressing their extensional equivalence. And a sentence is analytic (or tautological), if its 
proof does not make use of non-logical axioms, but acknowledges only the relevant 
definitions” (Carnap 1933: 75). Carnap elaborates this in a letter to Kaila; see Manninen 
(2007: 259–60). 




[T]here is not a single question concerning empirical, constructible reality which would 
be touched in any way by this controversy. The geography, e.g., of an epistemological 
realist contains exactly the same scientific statements as that of an epistemological 
idealist. According to either view, the ‘given’ is the same. The difference between the 
two views which say the same with respect to what is given, however, has to be 
imaginary, since in its final logical meaning any statement about the world is a 




the controversy between the phenomenologists and the atomists in physics rests solely 
on a misunderstanding. For if there are but sufficient empirical grounds for the 
existence of atoms and the like, then the atoms are to be taken as ‘real’ in precisely the 
same sense as, e.g., ‘this table here’, which is no more ‘given’ than the atoms. Both are 
sophisticated logical constructions of the same kind (‘physical things’) obtained from 
what is given. (ibid.) 
 
It is clear that Kaila’s reasons for being dissatisfied with Carnap’s position have nothing to do 
with “metaphysics”.10 What Kaila is concerned with are the implications of Aufbau for the 
status of science. He argues at some length that, in contrast to Carnapian “ideal manifolds” 
(ibid. 49), neither experienced time not perceptual space are quasi-analytically constructible: 
                                                 
10 Kaila (1930: 48–9) emphasizes that “the necessity of a rather radical anti-empiricist 
psychology of knowledge” does not imply a commitment to a priori metaphysics. 
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the former because quasi-analysis loses sight of the flow and direction of time; the latter 
because it cannot reproduce the infinity of perceptual space.11  
Now, Kaila contends, it is of course conceivable that beyond given sensory boundaries 
both space and time are empty or that both space and time are “filled with entirely chaotic 
content” beyond such boundaries (ibid. 48) But assuming that our life is neither an illusion 
nor a dream, we can pose the question: “if our perceptions are sample-like segments of an n-
dimensional manifold, what inferences can then be made from their given content to their 
not-given content?” This, Kaila argues against Carnap, “is precisely the question which 
empirical science is to answer” (ibid.) 
Apart from all specific details, then, the gist of Kaila’s criticism of Aufbau is that it 
substitutes an ideal construction for real-life science. This brings us back to the question from 
which we started: what is the import of “scientific philosophy” for Kaila? 
According to Kaila, Aufbau “is an attempt at a philosophical deepening and justification 
of certain fundamental principles of modern exact thought” (1930: 45). There is no question 
for anyone with any understanding of the nature of exact thought that such tools as formal 
logic, or the concept of implicit definition or of isomorphism are of the highest importance 
                                                 
11 Kaila’s criticisms of Aufbau were discussed by Reichenbach and his colleagues in 
Berlin as well as Carnap and some other members of the Vienna Circle in Vienna (Stadler 
1997: 176–8; Manninen 2007: 280–1). A précis of Carnap’s replies – which he reported in 
detail in a letter to Kaila – can be found in his discussion-note on Kaila’s monograph (Carnap 
1933: 76–7). Carnap – whom Kaila described to Reichenbach as a “formidable dialectician” – 
was largely unperturbed by the specific criticisms. And whichever conclusions one would 
eventually reach about the details, he argued, this would make no difference to the 
application of the “logistic method” itself (ibid. 77). 
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for any philosophy that claims to be scientific. Carnap’s Aufbau, however, is more than just 
an analysis or systematization of the formal principles and methods, as they are used “in their 
native domains” (ibid. 46). As they are used in Aufbau, however,  
 
[t]hese principles become absolutized: everything which cannot be formalized without 
residue, which does not submit to the requirement of purely structural statements, 
which offers resistance to the extensionality thesis and the principle of analytic 
equivalence or the requirement of decidability, all this is to be eliminated from science 
[…]. (ibid.) 
 
What renders a philosophy scientific is not a specific method or collection of methods, even 
if they have their origin in “modern exact though”. Indeed, on the contrary, such a conception 
carries with it a definite risk, exactly analogous to the one that Russell identified when he 
described the philosophical misuse of scientific ideas: only now the idea is formal 
(methodological), rather than contentual. Kaila’s idea of what makes philosophy scientific, I 
want to argue, is much more robust than what Russell had in mind in 1914 or Carnap in 1928. 
What does this robustness consist in? 
Let me make a bold suggestion. Kaila’s philosophy is, as we might put it, “robustly 
scientific” ultimately because his conception of philosophy and of its method is naturalistic. 
Like most catchwords, “naturalism” is of little use, if left unexplained. I will spend the rest of 
the essay to put some flesh on the bones of this proposal. 
 
4. Naturalism, as it is understood here, involves no less than four philosophical theses. 
Firstly, the most fundamental ingredient in naturalism is the assumption that there is but one 
way to knowledge, namely science, possibly broadly construed so as to include everyday or 
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pre-scientific knowledge and philosophy. Secondly, given this, it follows that there is no 
separate philosophical method. In particular, there is no “first philosophy”. And this means 
two things: on the one hand, there is no metaphysics and no metaphysical method distinct 
from the empirical method of science and providing a higher and superior road to knowledge 
or “wisdom”; on the other hand, there is no justificatory processes outside science and 
applicable to it, processes to which science would be accountable. Thirdly, the ethos of 
philosophy is thus factual rather than non-factual. To put the point in plain English, 
philosophers are concerned with reality as much as scientists – and more specifically, there is 
but one reality for scientists and philosophers to be jointly interested in. Fourthly – and this is 
to sum up the previous points – philosophy has no special province. It remains alive as a 
fruitful enterprise only as long as it seeks to contribute to what is ultimately one pursuit of 
human knowledge. This organic connection between special sciences and philosophy does 
not mean that there is no difference between the two. Philosophy is more general, as it is 
concerned with fundamental concepts and propositions; but it would be pointless to try to 
draw a strict line here between what belongs to philosophy and what belongs to science. And 
philosophy is also distinguished through the fact that it is systematic in its own special way; 
philosophers should not lose sight of the task of elaborating a world-view or a conception of 
the world.  
 
5. A characterization of Kaila’s philosophy as naturalism in the above sense gives rise to 
three quite general worries. The first two of them relate to Kaila’s adoption of logical 
empiricism, while the third one has to do with his life-long commitment to monism. 
In the first place, naturalism fits rather poorly with the meta-philosophical 
commitments of logical empiricism; and logical empiricism, of course, played a major role in 
Kaila’s struggle with the Problem of Constitution, as in Kaila’s two contributions to logical 
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empiricism, Kaila (1936; 1941). Keeping in mind what was said about Kaila and Carnap’s 
Aufbau, should we conclude that Kaila’s conception of the philosophical method undergoes a 
rather radical change sometimes after Der logistische Neupositivismus? In Kaila’s 1942-
paper, “Reaalitiedon logiikkaa” (“On the logic of factual knowledge”) we find the following 
passage: 
 
The systems of metaphysical philosophy fall into ruin very quickly, and a new building 
is erected from foundation. This does not happen in science. As a rule, its results 
continue to retain a relative justification; earlier results, once they are considered in the 
light of later developments, usually turn out to be approximations (“erste 
Annäherungen”), which are not “completely wrong” but require some adjustment. This 
applies to the results of logistic empiricism, for here it is a matter of factual research 
and not of “philosophizing”. (1942: 47) 
 
“The results of logistic empiricism” refer to the Constitution Theory. It may appear then that 
Kaila has by now adopted a conception of the philosophical method that is essentially 
“Russellian” in the sense described above. Such a conclusion would be unwarranted, 
however. I provide two brief considerations.  
Firstly, Kaila’s adoption of logical empiricism12 – including, crucially, the thesis of 
translatability – was a reaction to a specific point in the Problem of Constitution, not a result 
of meta-philosophical reflection. Very briefly, the point is this. As before, Kaila continued to 
argue that the very core of scientific thinking is in its connection to experience. This is “the 
fundamental principle of science” (Kaila 1942: 31), formulated now as the thesis of 
                                                 
12 Or “logistic empiricism”, as he prefers to call it (Kaila 1942: 27). 
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testability: every real sentence must have definite experiential consequences. The thesis is 
accepted by common consent and by no means implies a commitment to logical empiricism 
(ibid.) The latter view arises only from the recognition that such testability is possible only on 
the assumption that “factual concepts” are “reducible to experience” (ibid. 31–2). According 
to Kaila, then, the fundamental insight of logical empiricism is to be found in the 
apprehension that there is a principled connection between the fundamental principle and the 
formation of factual concepts in science (ibid. 32). 
Secondly – and this point is closely connected with the first one – a strong case can be 
made that for Kaila there was no internal relationship between the general problem of 
constitution and logical empiricism.13 Even when he addresses the problem within the context 
of logical empiricism – where it takes the more specific form of “constitution theory” – the 
key concept which defines the problem for Kaila is the perfectly general one of invariance as 
the criterion for reality. The concept is general-cum-defining, because “the search for higher 
invariances” and an account of experience in terms of maximal invariance are of 
“fundamental significance in the whole enterprise of acquiring knowledge” (Kaila 1936: 
152). Hence, Kaila’s adoption, during one period of his philosophical career, of the method of 
logical empiricism in no way compromises his naturalism. 
 
6. There is another big worry relating to logical empiricism about the Kaila–naturalism 
connection. This is the so-called linguistic theory of the a priori and of necessity, which 
                                                 
13 The point is really quite obvious in light of what Kaila’s views in the posthumous 
paper on the “perceptual and conceptual components of everyday experience” (Kaila 1960). 
What needs documenting is primarily how Kaila’s views on “translatability” developed over 
the years. Evidently this task falls outside the scope of the present paper. 
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Kaila (1939) includes among the main theses of logical empiricism. According to the theory, 
the concept of analyticity, conceived in terms of definitions and linguistic rules and hence as 
something essentially conventional, provides the key to understanding the concept of truth in 
formal sciences – logic and mathematics – as opposed to factual sciences. As Kaila explains: 
 
Everything that is analytic is of the character of a definition in the sense explained 
above, that is, is of the character of a convention. We set up certain conventions and 
adhere to them strictly; this is the answer to the question of how there can be sentences 
which are “necessary truths” holding in “all possible worlds”.14 
 
Kaila here speaks only of necessity, but the explanation is meant to apply to apriority as well. 
The latter concept is indeed in the focus, and the corresponding claim about necessity is just a 
corollary to it; for it is the linguistic account of apriority that is an essential ingredient in the 
empiricist account of a sentence’s factual content. In Kaila’s formulation, “the first main 
thesis of logical empiricism” says that the statements “sentence S is analytic” and “sentence S 
is a priori” are equivalent (1939: 173). Now, every sentence which is about reality must 
possess a certain factual content, that is, it must have definitive experiential consequences; 
this is “the second main thesis of logical empiricism”. Putting the theses together, we get an 
explanation of why formal truths are devoid of factual content: such truths are analytic or true 
in virtue of linguistic conventions and hence they are true no matter what our experience is 
like. Elsewhere Kaila explains that the empiricism of logical empiricism applies only to 
factual sentences and factual concepts, but here the requirement of empiricism is absolutely 
strict; equally strict, however, is the “rationalism” or “logicism” that is inherent in logical 
                                                 
14 Kaila (1939: 173); translation by AK. 
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empiricism (1942: 26–7). That is, the logical empiricist explanations of analyticity and of 
factual content work only if the distinction between what is formal (a priori, necessary) and 
what is factual is absolutely sharp. 
The linguistic account of apriority introduces a gap between factual and formal truth, 
between the realm of empirical science, where truth is accountable to experience and the 
realm of mathematics and logic, where truth is decided by convention. But what, then, comes 
of naturalism, which is supposed to recognize but one fabric of knowledge?   
This is the worry and it is very much to the point. I insert three comments on it. Firstly, 
the linguistic account of apriority puts a great deal of weight on conventions. Now, it could 
be argued that conventions are in fact not so deeply inimical to naturalism. After all, 
conventions in the sense relevant here appear to be facts about language-usage and as such 
they are amenable to a scientific study just like any other empirical facts. 
To reason this way, however, is arguably to misconstrue the role of conventions in the 
logical empiricist epistemology. Kaila, for one, is not very clear about what this role is 
supposed to be, but the above quotation from Inhimillinen tieto and other similar 
explanations15 indicate acceptance of what, perhaps, qualifies as the standard version of the 
linguistic account of apriority. On this view, a priori knowledge is grounded in knowledge of 
stipulations regarding the meanings of certain words plus knowledge of a range of truths that 
follow from these stipulations. 
One problem with this standard picture is that facts about usage are arguably 
thoroughly empirical – which, of course, is the reason why they might at first sight be 
                                                 
15 “Logic does not prescribe anything. In it we set up conventions regarding certain 
things – certain operations in particular – and observe what will come about when these 
conventions are followed” (Kaila 1942, p. 29; translation by AK). 
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acceptable to a naturalist as well. But then it is quite impossible to see how such facts could 
act, as Arthur Pap (1955: 114) puts it, as reasons for truths which are a priori and hence 
necessary. 
If this is admitted, the grounding-relation must be construed in some other way. 
Plausibly, a logical empiricist is committed to regarding conventions as constitutive rules. We 
need not explore here how this idea is to be cashed out; whichever way the question is 
resolved, the conclusion must be that the linguistic account of apriority is indicative of an 
anti-naturalist epistemology. 
Secondly, one might argue that naturalism is incompatible with apriority only when the 
latter concept is given a quite specific content, content which is taken more or less as a matter 
of course in much of traditional epistemology but which it would be a mistake to see as an 
ineliminable element of apriority. Traditionally, apriority is taken to imply such strong 
properties as certainty and unrevisability (cf. Goldman 1999). Clearly, the linguistic account 
of apriority complies with tradition in this respect. To spell out an alternative account of 
apriority is a task for naturalized epistemology. How Kaila would have reacted to such an 
enterprise is a matter for speculation.  
On the other hand, and this is the third point, one could speculate that the traditional 
notion of apriority does not in fact resonate very well with some of Kaila’s deeper 
convictions about knowledge. It is correct to say, I think, that Kaila’s conception of human 
beings and their cognitive life was thoroughly biological. Such a view, if followed out 
consistently, decrees that no segment of factual discourse is irreducibly a priori, at least if 
apriority is construed in the traditional way. Whether Kaila had any settled opinions on this 
issue – or unsettled, for that matter – is, again, something I do not know. 
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7. The third general worry about Kaila and naturalism concerns reduction. A naturalist 
philosopher believes that science is the ultimate arbiter in question of existence. A typical 
naturalist, however, argues that this role in fact belongs to the one fundamental science of 
physics (hence the term “physicalism”); and hence that anything that is not physics has 
ontological consequences only if it can be shown to be acceptable from the physicalist point 
of view. Hence, naturalism is typically seen as implying a commitment to a strong form of 
reductionism. 
This aspect of naturalism introduces a topic that is of considerable importance in 
Kaila’s philosophy – even apart from the question of his alleged naturalism. It is well-known 
that Kaila’s vision of reality was monistic, a feature that was certainly very deep in his 
philosophical personality:  
 
I do not believe, and have never believed ever since my philosophical awakening, that 
there should be any unbridgeable gap between the so-called material and the so-called 
mental, or between the inanimate and the animate, or the body and the mind. All such 
differences are in fact just relative differences of degree and not absolute, qualitative 
ones. The world which we experience, the world we see, hear and feel; in this world the 
material and the mental, the inanimate and the animate, the body and the mind are 
intertwined in such a way that no absolute distinction between these characteristics can, 
in my opinion, be drawn. They are held together by hidden connections, connections 
that weave them together into one “all-unity”. If, for example, we understand 
“material” and “mental” in such a way that the one excludes the other absolutely, then, 
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according to the unitarian view, neither of these two exists but there is something third; 
what this “third thing” is like is something that we learn from experience.16  
 
On the other hand, and this is also shown by the end of the quotation, Kaila’s monism is of a 
non-reductive kind. When he sought to overcome such dualisms as those between the mind 
and the matter, between the phenomenal and the physical, between quality and structure, his 
task was never that of reduction but of unification. According to Kaila, moreover, this 
unification is a matter of scientific theories; the core of the monistic or “unitarian” philosophy 
is the belief that the striving towards unification that is present in science and the formation 
of scientific theories can, indeed, be carried out in full. Insofar as there are obstacles standing 
in the way of this goal, these are just empirical difficulties which can be overcome by 
strenuous effort (1953: 514). This may be non-standard, as far as naturalism goes; on the 
other hand, one may well argue that the spirit behind Kaila’s “unitarian” monism is more 
genuinely scientific and naturalist than what is found in most naturalist philosophers of today. 
I cannot elaborate this point here, though. 
 
8. I have mentioned some potential points of conflict between Kaila’s logical empiricism and 
his naturalism. It is all the more remarkable, then, that naturalism in fact shows itself even in 
Inhimillinen tieto, which is, after all, intended to provide a systematic exposition of logical 
empiricism. Consider what Kaila does in the first four chapters of the book, which constitutes 
its historical part. There he describes the role that the search for invariances has played in the 
                                                 
16 Kaila (1953: 506); translation by AK. 
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history of science, as it created, first, Greek science and then, over two millennia later, the 
Galilean conception of knowledge, which underlies modern science.17 
It is quite remarkable that when Kaila speaks about knowledge in Inhimillinen tieto, 
what he has in mind is not the concept of knowledge in anything like the sense that has been 
prevalent in contemporary analytic philosophy, but the fabric of actual human knowledge. 
Nowhere is he trying to analyze the concept of knowledge, as an “analytic” philosopher 
might, or the justification conditions of knowledge, or any such thing. His focus is 
exclusively on human knowledge as an actual and perfectly natural entity. The concept of 
invariance is not something that Kaila arrives at through an analysis of the concept of 
knowledge. Rather, he argues that human cognition is in fact everywhere guided by the 
search for invariances, which has a biological basis deep in our nature. It is what has created 
                                                 
17 As Kaila sees it, logical empiricism is not a response to a specific set of problems in 
empiricist epistemology (at least not if these are described in the standard, “philosophical” 
way). His view of the pre-history of “logical empiricism” is much more exciting. In his view, 
logical empiricism is the eventual outcome of a gradual process whereby scientists and 
philosophers have more and more clearly grasped a number of key elements inherent in the 
Galilean conception of knowledge. These include at least the following: (i) the search for 
invariances, leading to a strongly “rationalized” or idealized mathematical theory, in which 
the multiplicity of experience is present only in a radically simplified form; (ii) the 
requirement of verification, subject to the condition mentioned in (i) but, equally, itself 
imposing an essential condition on “rationalization”; (iii) the notion that there is a clear 
distinction between formal and material truth, which leads to the view that natural science 
offers nothing but “a probable opinion” but also to the insight that  there is in fact no other 
knowledge than this probable opinion. 
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science, but it applies more widely, to pre-scientific everyday thinking as well as, say, to 
aesthetic experience and artistic style (Kaila 1939: 16). What is specifically philosophical 
here is the insight that, on a conceptual level, the search for thing-like invariances (things 
with their immutable essences) created Greek science, which was then eventually replaced by 
Galilean science, where the invariant is not to be found in things but in the unchanging 
relations obtaining between changing things. The story Kaila tells us here is a perfect 
example of how there is room for genuinely philosophical insight, even if one’s approach is 
broadly “naturalistic”. 
 
9. What, then, of philosophy itself? In Inhimillinen tieto Kaila remarks in passing that there is 
“no knowledge of reality except so-called ordinary scientific knowledge, including our pre-
scientific everyday knowledge, and all of this is founded upon experience” (1939: 184). 
Given this, the question arises: What is the status of philosophy in the fabric of human 
knowledge? 
One occasion where Kaila addresses this question at some length is in his 1929-book, 
Nykyinen maailmankäsitys (“The contemporary view of the world”). Kaila’s book consists in 
four lengthy chapters, entitled “Space and Time”, “Matter”, “Life” and “Soul”, respectively, 
and these are full of discussions relating to recent findings in physics and chemistry, in 
experimental biology and psychology as well as philosophical work analyzing these results; 
Kaila mentions Reichenbach, Russell, Carnap as well as the Gestalt-theorists Köhler, 
Wertheimer and Goldstein. In Chapter I, Section 9, entitled “The Relationship of Philosophy 
to Science”, Kaila anticipates a question that, he surmises, may have occurred to a reader who 
is familiar with “philosophy”; all this stuff – physics, chemistry, experimental biology, etc. – 
may be important, but is it “philosophy”? To address this question, Kaila considers at some 
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length what relationship scientific – that is, “rigorously serious and strictly factual” – 
philosophy bears to special sciences (1929: 95).  
The brief answer is that philosophy is the beginning of science. This is meant not only 
in the familiar historical sense but also in systematic sense that every special science has its 
fundamental presuppositions and most general concepts, the study of which is philosophy, no 
matter whether this study is done by scientists themselves or by people with a publicly 
recognized status as philosophers, that is, academic philosophers. And philosophy is also the 
end of science, because the most general results of special sciences, the results that are 
significant for the “general view of the world”, belong, again, to philosophy; for throughout 
its history philosophy has been aiming at this kind of general view of the world: 
 
Disowning its own children, the special sciences, philosophy will be withering, losing 
sight of reality, eventually getting lost in hallucinations. It can lead the stern and 
vigorous life of science only as long as its children feed it with strong nourishment. If 
special sciences disown their mother, philosophy, they will lose their deeper 
significance, sinking to the level of stamp collecting or some other such innocent – and 
petty – pastime. (ibid.) 
 
Given this mutual influence, there is no sharp line between philosophy and special sciences. 
Sometimes it is said that philosophy is distinguished from science proper by the fact that 
whereas the latter is characterized by relatively steady progress, philosophy is nothing but the 
“cemetery of philosophical systems”. Such a view, Kaila argues, would be superficial, being 
based on a certain historical myopia. 
For example, questions relating to the nature of space and time, the “relativity” of 
spatial and temporal determinations, occupied an important role in Leibniz’s and Kant’s 
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thinking. These very same questions are now addressed in the most general parts of modern 
physics. But if these questions were philosophy when they were reflected upon using 
unsophisticated tools, less than fully articulated concepts, and in a most tenuous relation to 
experience, all the more are they philosophy now that they are being investigated with precise 
concepts and in close relationship to experience. The inevitable intrusion of mathematics 
makes no difference here, says Kaila. It only means that a modern philosopher must be 
sufficiently acquainted with the relevant conceptual and mathematical tools; lacking these, he 
is no philosopher in the sense in which Leibniz or Kant were philosophers and, consequently, 
has no right to speak. 
If this conception of philosophy strikes one as strange, Kaila notes, that is only because 
after Kant professional philosophy ceased to be the universal science which it had been for 
the likes of Leibniz and Kant, becoming replaced by a kind of “humanistic study”. This is 
perhaps the most fateful event in the history of professional philosophy, as it undermines the 
connection with natural science and mathematics. Writing in 1929, Kaila expresses the hope 
that this “deplorable state of things is coming to its end” (1929, p. 99). 
Kaila’s naturalism, then, is nothing new. As he himself acknowledges, it can be found 
in many past masters like Leibniz and Kant.18 To be a naturalist in the sense that is relevant 
here, one only needs to retain the connection between philosophy and reality – allow me to 
put the point somewhat bluntly – a connection that has not been a matter of course for much 
of twentieth century philosophy. For Kaila this attitude was just such a matter of course. 
 
                                                 
18 Of course, this does not mean that Leibniz and Kant would have been out-and-out 
naturalists. Here naturalism concerns just the relationship between “theoretical philosophy” 
and science.  
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